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Executive summary
Facilitating the financing of European companies through external equity is a central 
ambition of European Union financial regulation, including in the European Commission’s 
capital markets union agenda. An emphasis on equity is justified because Europe’s compa-
nies remain vulnerable because they hold excess debt and reliance on bank finance will make 
capital expenditures highly cyclical. Also, equity investors mobilise operational and corporate 
governance reforms within investee firms that lift firm productivity. 
The share of listed equity in the total balance sheets of EU non-financial companies has 
expanded, though this is limited to the core euro area, and to large companies. While net 
funding from listed equity issuance has declined, private equity has rapidly expanded and is 
back at pre-crisis levels. This is a welcome development because, compared to public equity, 
private equity is accessed by a wider range of smaller companies. 
Firm-level data suggests that the use of external equity is still relatively exceptional. 
The share of firms using external equity has dropped since the immediate aftermath of the 
financial crisis, when loan conditions tightened. Although overall financing conditions have 
improved, the perceived gap between needs and availability of equity financing has not nar-
rowed. 
The United Kingdom is Europe’s most advanced equity market; other EU countries are 
considerably less attractive to private equity investors, and there have been no improvements 
in key policy areas. Specifically, corporate governance practices, such as the rights of minority 
shareholders, remain an obstacle and underline a reluctance to dilute the control of estab-
lished owners. 
Private equity activity in the EU still shows a strong home bias. Fundraising from 
outside the private equity firm’s home base, and eventual divestment outside national capital 
markets, have become marginally more significant, though overall remain quite limited. 
Government agencies still play an important role in funding, and smaller countries remain 
particularly constrained by local capital markets. 
The European regulation of private equity reflects post-crisis concerns about financial 
stability risks that are largely unjustified by the industry’s business model. Fragmentation of 
supervision further complicates cross-border distribution of funds. The exit from the single 
market of the UK as the home of nearly half the European investor base poses a serious threat 
to equity funding in the EU. In the context of further capital markets union legislation, the EU 
should consider greater risk tolerance and harmonised capital requirements.
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1 Introduction 
The funding of European companies is characterised by a bias towards debt and against external 
equity. Obstacles to externally provided equity arise because of the preferential tax treatment of 
debt and because of barriers in corporate governance, which complicate the direct involvement 
of minority shareholders. There is a broader conservatism among providers of capital because 
households are risk averse and favour bank deposits rather than capital-market instruments, 
possibly because of inadequate financial literacy (European Commission, 2017a).
This realisation was one reason for the capital markets union action plan proposed by the 
European Commission in 2015. The first results from the action plan include the new regime for 
venture capital funds, a simplified prospectus regulation and the new securitisation framework 
(Sapir et al, 2018). Ongoing work by the Commission at the time of writing focuses on the rules 
related to listing on public equity markets and how these rules could be made more proportion-
ate to the needs of small and medium-sized companies (SMEs).
As a period of extraordinary monetary easing in the euro area comes to an end, the facilita-
tion of equity finance could address the balance-sheet vulnerabilities of highly leveraged firms.
The empirical literature has underlined that a protracted period of deleveraging could per-
petuate low productivity growth and affect the wider corporate sector, beyond those compa-
nies that are excessively leveraged. Attracting equity into highly leveraged firms, in particular 
private equity, could raise firm performance, as these investors have been shown to upgrade 
operational efficiency and governance standards within the firms in which they invest.
Against this background, we examine the present use of external equity by EU com-
panies1. In section 2 we gauge the roles of listings on public markets, which are limited to 
well-established and larger companies, and of private equity, which is available to a wider 
range of companies. Section 3 examines a firm-level dataset to detect changing perceptions 
of the availability and need for equity finance. In Section 4 we sketch out the regulatory 
impediments in national laws, and assess to what extent EU market integration has overcome 
the crucial obstacle of shallow local capital markets. Home bias seems to be little changed; 
section 5 proposes a number of steps in the next phase of the capital markets union agenda 
that could make this crucial financing instrument more widely accessible. Such an agenda is 
doubly needed in the context of the exit from the EU of the UK, which is home to nearly half of 
the European industry, and risks disrupting equity finance across the EU. 
2 The potential of equity finance 
In the immediate aftermath of the European financial crisis, credit standards applied by 
banks tightened considerably (ECB, 2017). Since then, the drastic reduction in European 
Central Bank policy interest rates and the more recent quantitative easing have of course 
improved funding conditions. The ECB corporate sector purchasing programme applies to 
bonds of highly rated companies, though lower financing costs have benefited a wider range 
of companies, including unrated or highly risky ones. 
Recent trends 
Figure 1 shows the composition of funding of EU companies and underlines that changes in 
financing patterns of European companies have been very uneven. We aggregate trends for 
three country groups: euro-area core countries (EA Core); euro-area crisis countries that have 
1   External equity is understood as that provided by external investors, unrelated to the firm, ie excluding owner finance 
through retained earnings, and employee shareholdings.
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been affected by protracted deleveraging following the financial crisis (EA Crisis); and the 
EU member states of central and southeast Europe where bank-dominated financial systems 
proved quite resilient (EU11) (see note to Figure 1 for a list of the countries in each group). 
In all three groups the share of bank loans relative to aggregate balance sheets has 
declined. This is most clearly the case in the euro-area crisis countries. In the euro-area core 
this decline has been largely made up for by more significant funding from both listed and 
unlisted equity. A similar pattern is evident in the euro-area crisis countries, though as their 
corporate sectors experienced protracted credit and financing constraints, external equity 
is less significant. As the deleveraging process progressed, own equity and retained earnings 
became more prominent. In the EU11 countries of central and south-eastern Europe, the 
contraction in bank lending appears to have been more muted, and these countries show the 
least realignment of financing patterns. 
Figure 1: Composition of corporate financing before and after the crisis
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat. Note: EA Core is composed of Netherlands, France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Finland and Luxem-
bourg. EA Crisis countries include Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy, Cyprus and Ireland. EU11 is Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Poland, Romania, Estonia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Lithuania and Latvia. 
Looking at funding flows, the net issuance of listed equity by non-financial euro-area 
companies was estimated at €16.5 billion in 2017, representing a roughly 9 percent drop from 
the previous year2. Even though gross issuance has not declined significantly, in the current 
context of low bond yields and a high equity premium, share buybacks by established listed 
firms have been at a record high. Another explanation for the decline in initial public offerings 
(IPOs) is the reduction in the number of SMEs listing on public markets (AFME, 2017). IPOs 
are dominated by larger firms, and overall the share of first-time issuance remains low when 
compared to other markets, such as the US and UK (European Commission, 2017a).
This contrasts with much greater dynamism in private equity transactions. According to 
industry statistics, in 2017 about €71.7 billion was invested in European companies by this 
2  Data from the European Central Bank, available at https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=130.
SEC.M.I8.1100.F51100.M.4.Z01.E.Z.
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sector3. This represented a sharp increase over the previous year, returning investment flows 
to just under their peak ahead of the financial crisis. Net of divestments this represented a 
flow of about €29.3 billion into the European corporate sector. Figure 2 contrasts the develop-
ments in the two components of equity finance. 
Private equity investors have also funded a much larger number of firms, and the vast 
majority of the roughly 5,000 firms were SMEs. Investment flows were nevertheless quite 
concentrated within a small number of countries, with the UK and Ireland, France and the 
Benelux region representing more than half of the total investment. Of the EU11 countries, 
Poland, Romania and Hungary appear to be the only significant investment locations, though 
even in Poland, where firms attracted the greatest volume of investment among the EU11 
countries, investment flows of about 0.2 percent of GDP are miniscule relative to the more 
developed private equity destinations in Europe. 
Figure 2: Trends in public and private equity transactions (€ billions)
Source: Bruegel based on AFME (panel A), Invest Europe (panel B). Note: Panel B data relates to all of Europe and industry aggregates, ie 
including a small amount of non-EU portfolio companies.
Corporate sector vulnerabilities
It is clear that these relatively limited flows of equity financing will be inadequate to make a 
dent in the excess corporate leverage that continues to be a legacy of the financial crisis. 
As Figure 3 shows, aggregate corporate debt ratios have not markedly declined since 
2008, and have in fact increased slightly in the euro-area core countries. A large number of 
countries with corporate debt ratios in excess of a critical ratio of 90 percent of GDP, or those 
which have recently witnessed increases in debt ratios, are not significant recipients of either 
private or listed equity (Cecchetti et al, 2011). There is evidence that less-leveraged firms are 
more resilient in times of economic downturn, and in the European financial crisis the most 
severely impacted economies were also those with more shallow equity bases (EIB, 2018; 
Langfeld and Pagano, 2016).
3   Figures from Invest Europe. 
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Figure 3: Corporate debt before and after the crisis, percent of GDP
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat.  
Private equity and firm performance 
Given the absence of a significant equity market for smaller companies, unlisted or private 
equity is the most likely form of equity financing for the largest number of EU firms. A brief 
look at the business model of these investors underlines the ambiguous effect on debt of the 
involvement of private equity investors, and also the benefits in terms of firm performance. 
Private equity caters to three distinct types of company: 
• The key targets of private equity investors are companies that are growing but are capi-
tal-constrained. These companies have a proven commercial concept and a track record. 
Private equity investors will acquire significant stakes and take these firms into a further 
growth phase, for instance by assisting in their expansion into international markets4.
• A subset of private equity targets highly innovative companies. Venture capital remains a 
small though much sought-after subsector of the private equity industry. Venture capital 
investors have the risk appetite and have developed distinct tools to cater to firms that 
have technology that is yet not ready for commercial application and for which returns are 
highly uncertain. 
• Another type of private equity fund is turnaround investors that target companies that 
might be stagnating but which have considerable inefficiencies that can be addressed 
through a programme of operational and financial restructuring. Investors might inject 
senior debt, in addition to equity. While such investors could be particularly suitable for 
the significant number of European companies with excess debt, this type of investment is 
as yet relatively rare. 
While private equity is the principal instrument to inject equity into smaller companies, 
it should be acknowledged that so-called buyout investors regularly increase leverage in the 
companies they invest in. Overall, empirical studies confirm that private equity-backed firms 
are less likely to fail (Frontier Economics, 2013). 
4   In private equity data this is considered buyout and accounts for up to 71.4 percent of the total PE investment in 
Europe in 2017 (Invest Europe, 2018).
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Unlike other types of investment fund, the industry does not suffer from liquidity risks. A 
private equity fund collects commitments from a range of institutional and private investors. 
Pension funds are the main investor type. These so-called limited partners will be tied to the 
fund for up to ten years. This explains an unusually long investment horizon in implementing 
a new business plan. Venture capital is significantly funded by government agencies, espe-
cially in the less advanced EU11 countries, or where government agencies have compensated 
for the reduction in private-sector venture capital, as in the euro-area crisis countries. 
Private equity funds are also actively engaged in the management of firms. The funds are 
best known for their restructuring of the operations of the companies they invest in. Value 
is created through a programme of cost cutting and repositioning the product and company 
in the marketplace. This goes hand-in-hand with reforms to the governance of the firm, as 
managers will be subject to more stringent performance targets. The private equity business 
model is therefore not suitable in cases in which poor corporate governance or other obsta-
cles to the engagement of minority investors complicate operational and governance change. 
There is now an extensive empirical literature that substantiates the positive effects of pri-
vate equity on the performance of investee firms (Frontier Economics, 2013). These effects are 
particularly strong when private equity investors lift credit constraints, as opposed to merely 
focusing on operational restructuring. This was the context for the study by EBRD (2015) on 
the impact of private equity in emerging Europe, based on data for investee firms from over 
100 funds. Based on a comparison with a peer group of companies there was clear evi-
dence that operating revenues rose more strongly in companies that attracted private equity 
investment. Overall, labour productivity increased by a third more than in the control group, 
suggesting that additional capital expenditure raises operational efficiency. 
3 The evolution of equity finance 
Despite these benefits, external equity remains a marginal financing component for European 
companies. 
EU companies’ access to equity can be tracked through a regular survey conducted by 
the ECB and the European Commission 5. Figure 4 shows the shares of respondents that have 
accessed external equity in the previous half year. It is striking that this share has dropped 
sharply between the immediate crisis aftermath of 2009-11 and the most recent three-year 
period. As would be expected, the shares of SMEs accessing equity finance have been consist-
ently lower than those of large companies. There has been less use of external equity in the 
euro-area crisis countries than in core countries, and less still in EU11 countries.
These shares are low; however, when firms are asked which type of external financing 
they would prefer most, a much higher proportion of respondents identifies equity than the 
proportion that has drawn on it.  
Another way to put actual financing into context is to assess the responses of firms on 
perceived financing gaps. The ECB has produced a composite measure based on perceptions 
of changes in needs and availability of different types of financing. A large value suggests a 
large number of firms perceived deteriorating gaps, or simultaneously saw increased needs 
and reduced availability over the previous six months. Analysis by the ECB (2017) showed that 
5   The ECB and European Commission Survey on the access to finance of enterprises (‘SAFE survey’) is the most 
comprehensive data source on corporate financing and perceptions of financing options. It has been run regularly 
since 2013. The survey covers firms of all sizes and provides data on the financing conditions and instruments used 
by SMEs. It assesses access to eleven different sources of financing, including issuance of equity capital. In addition, 
a section of the questionnaire reveals firms’ responses on financing needs, and their perception of availability of 
different instruments.
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SMEs reported easing financing conditions for the euro area as a whole, once responses for 
five financing instruments were averaged (Figure 5, left hand panel).
Figure 4: Share of respondents that have accessed external equity in the half year 
prior to the survey6
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Source: Bruegel based on question Q4 of the SAFE survey “Are the following sources of financing relevant to your enterprise, that is, 
have you used them in the past or considered using them in the future? If “YES”, have you used this type in the past 6 months? [Equity 
capital]”. Country groups represent weighted averages based on 2009 GDP.
A very different picture emerges when only the equity finance component is assessed, as is 
evident in the right-hand panel of Figure 5. At least among SMEs, there has been a predomi-
nant perception of tightening availability in all three country groups. 
The limited access to equity finance might be due to the nature of European firms. In their 
taxonomy of SME financing patterns, Moritz et al (2016) identified firms that are more likely 
to access equity as younger, more innovative and with higher growth expectations.
But over time, the availability of equity finance should at least keep pace with that of other 
financing options. This data suggests that despite the need to address post-crisis excess debt, 
neither SMEs nor, when the full dataset is examined, large companies have reported a marked 
and consistent easing in equity availability relative to perceived needs.
6 
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Figure 5: SMEs’ perceptions of financing gaps 
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Source: Bruegel based on SAFE microdata. Note: A positive value reflects that the change in financing needs exceeds the change in 
availability. The financing gaps are aggregated for the country groups based on GDP-weighted averages.
4 Regulatory reform and capital market 
integration
The relative costs of equity finance will be a function of a number of macroeconomic varia-
bles, and credit conditions (See Deutsche Bundesbank, 2018; S&P, 2018). Masiak et al (2017) 
identified as determinants the inflation rate, inflation volatility, unemployment rate, tax rates, 
GDP per capita and GDP growth rates. As information about SMEs is seen as more opaque 
than information about large enterprises, the former will be particularly penalised by banks 
when risk aversion rises and credit constraints spread (ECB, 2014).
Equity finance is more influenced than loan financing by the policy framework – in 
particular in terms of the engagement of minority investors and their capacity to restructure 
companies – and by the depth and sophistication of the local capital market. There is little 
evidence that these national policy conditions have become more conducive.
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Regulatory conditions within EU countries 
Figure 6 shows the attractiveness of country groups for private equity investors in relation to a 
number of characteristics related to the business environment7. 
Relative to the UK as the most advanced private equity market in Europe, core euro-area 
countries fall short on both the depth of local capital markets and the human and social 
environment (largely reflecting labour-market rigidities). Inadequate corporate governance 
standards seem to be an additional factor. In both the euro-area crisis countries and in the 
EU11 the depth of local capital markets and the lack of investment opportunities seem to 
undermine private equity activity. 
Figure 6: EU attractiveness to private equity relative to the US
Source: Bruegel based on scores from the private equity and venture capital attractiveness index (Groh et al, 2018). Note: Values repre-
sent a score relative to the US market at 100.
Little improvement can be detected in the attractiveness of the EU to private equity, when 
looking at the index in Groh et al (2018; see Figure 6 and footnote 7). 
The index for investor protection and corporate governance, for instance, shows a slight 
deterioration in absolute terms, and in an international ranking, for all three groups. By con-
trast, the UK has retained rank 7 worldwide in this area. Labour market rigidities are relevant 
to equity investors where they engage in operational restructuring. Again, this component has 
deteriorated in all three country groups, which have not advanced in the worldwide ranking. 
Together, the legal regime for investor protection and corporate governance, and labour 
market flexibility, account for about a third of the overall country attractiveness index devel-
oped in this index, though these are policy areas that could be addressed to provide a more 
conducive environment for investors. 
7   Groh et al (2010) surveyed the literature and also constructed the country attractiveness index which since then has 
closely tracked actual flows and currently covers 125 countries. The latest data is available in Groh et al (2018). 
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Home bias and local capital market depth 
As in other asset classes liquidity of local capital markets and access to them by non-resi-
dent investors are other key determinants of private equity activity. Local market liquidity is 
needed for the eventual exit from an investment; this appears to be particularly important for 
venture capital investment in younger firms. Bank-centric financial systems have therefore 
been less successful in attracting private equity. Apart from inadequate market liquidity, the 
lack of market infrastructure and expertise among local market participants seems to explain 
a lower level of equity activity (Black and Gilson, 1998). 
Here too, the key country groups fall behind the benchmark set by the UK8. There has been 
little movement over the past four years in perceptions of market liquidity, with the excep-
tion of the euro-area crisis countries, where market activity seems to have revived. But policy 
aimed at the development of national capital markets as a source of both private and listed 
equity finance might be misdirected where individual markets integrate, as will ultimately be 
the case within the EU capital markets union. 
However, the integration of national private equity markets within the EU appears to be 
quite limited so far. European private equity firms remain overwhelmingly dependent on 
funding from investors within their home countries. The share of funding attracted from Euro-
pean investors outside the home has marginally increased since the immediate aftermath of 
the financial crisis, though overall this share barely exceeds one fifth (Table 1a)9. The increase 
in the share of European funding is most evident in the euro-area core countries, and the 
share is highest in the EU countries of central and south-eastern Europe, which of course have 
very limited domestic investor bases. A key exception to equity market fragmentation is the 
UK, which accounts for about one third of private equity investments in the EU27.
In terms of exiting from investments, Table 1b shows that private equity funds continue 
to depend largely on national investors within their home bases as ultimate owners of assets. 
This will be a problem in markets with shallow pools of local institutional investors, as in the 
central and south-eastern European EU countries. The share of assets divested outside the 
home base is low at about 17 percent for the three country groups in aggregate, and increased 
only marginally in the most recent four-year period. 
Table 1: Home bias in fundraising and divestment by European private equity firms
a. Shares of total funds raised from domestic investors and EU 
investors outside the private equity firm’s home base
b. Shares of foreign 
divestment in total 
divestment by private 
equity firms
Domestic
EU outside the fund’s 
home base
2010-13 2014-17 2010-13 2014-17 2010-13 2014-17
 Average of 
three groups
56.6 56.8 16.2 20.4 15.5 17.2
EA Core 59.7 59.9 17.6 19.7 17.0 19.2
EA Crisis 47.2 39.7 5.0 22.0 8.2 10.0
EU-11 10.9 26.5 49.7 43.0 30.0 18.2
Source: Invest Europe. Note: Table 1b is constructed as ‘foreign divestments by local private equity firms’ over total divestments (no data 
for European divestments are available). 
As in other asset classes, a strong home bias can be observed in EU private equity activ-
8   The index in Groh et al (2010) is based on equity market capitalisation and issuing activity, as well as credit markets 
and infrastructure indicators. 
9   According to Invest Europe, in larger funds above €1 billion, domestic investors are less significant and non-EU 
investors play a more dominant role, accounting for almost two thirds of fund raising. 
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ity10. It is not surprising that the fund managers who exercise control seek to invest in firms 
in close proximity. However, fund raising by private equity funds could benefit from a much 
larger pool of institutional investors from across Europe, and national capital markets need 
not limit the ultimate divestments nor discourage exposures. The figures in Table 1 underline 
that to date there has been very little progress in overcoming the limitations of national capi-
tal markets and investor pools. 
Regulation in the capital markets union
Private equity has always been controversial in the public discussion on appropriate capital 
market regulation. The financial crisis disrupted a rapid rise of the industry and the regulatory 
discussion therefore assumed there were similar liquidity risks as in the hedge fund industry. 
This seems to be reflected in the treatment of the industry in the Alternative Investment Fund 
Managers Directive of 2011 (the AIFMD). 
Two concerns typically underpin regulation of the private equity industry. The first is 
transparency and disclosure, which are of course inferior to that provided by publicly-listed 
companies. Private equity funds are solely aimed at institutional investors or wealthy indi-
viduals who will receive extensive information and require more limited protection. The key 
issue therefore seems to be other stakeholders, in particular employees, and how they are 
impacted by operational restructuring under private equity ownership. The second concern 
is the systemic risk that can arise from maturity mismatches and leverage. Again, this applies 
less to private equity than to other investors, given private equity’s typically long-term funding 
commitments, and given that limited partners are unable to redeem their investment early. 
Leverage created in individual transactions (not at the level of the fund company) is indeed a 
concern, even though linkages and correlations between investee companies are likely quite 
low (Payne, 2011). 
The AIFMD nevertheless puts in place a fairly onerous regime of capital coverage and 
limits on distributions to the fund company. Only investment in SMEs benefits from certain 
exemptions (Moloney, 2014). A key problem seems to be that fund managers need to appoint 
a depositary in each jurisdiction. In a so-called investment triangle with investors and the 
fund manager, the depositary has the roles of custodian and monitor of the fund manager. 
The depositary, not the manager, acts as a reporting counterpart to local supervisors. Frag-
mentation in supervision of the industry and inadequate powers of the European Securities 
and Markets Authority (ESMA) as the EU capital markets supervisor therefore result in costly 
and complex duplication of services and reporting across member states. A proposal by the 
Commission from early 2018 that is designed to ease the cross-border distribution of col-
lective investment funds is still seen as inadequate by the industry (European Commission, 
2018). 
Brexit could further aggravate the fragmentation of the EU private equity market. The UK 
is home to about a fifth of Europe’s private equity firms, and accounts for nearly half of the 
assets under management, which are collected from across the EU. The UK industry seems 
to play a crucial intermediary function in investments across the EU. The likely loss of UK 
firms’ passporting rights within the single market at the end of the transition period could 
prove highly disruptive to fund allocations by European institutional investors and therefore 
to equity funding of European companies. A ‘third country passport’ regime, should therefore 
be developed speedily.
10  A financial integration index compiled by the ECB shows similar values and trends. Equity funds and other equity is-
sued in the euro area but outside the investor’s home country rose from 17 to 21 percent of average national holdings 
in the last ten years: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/financial_markets_and_interest_rates/financial_integration/
html/index.en.html. 
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5 Conclusions 
External equity finance is rapidly shifting from public markets to private transactions. This is 
explained by the extraordinary monetary easing in the EU that has reduced the costs of debt 
finance, leading large companies to retire a growing share of listed equity. By contrast, smaller 
companies that are growing or have promising prospects, increasingly seek funding outside 
public markets through private equity transactions. As these investors initiate governance and 
operational improvements over the course of a long-term engagement in the companies they 
invest in, private equity is a highly desirable funding instrument in terms of reviving tepid 
productivity growth and redressing excess leverage. Nevertheless, major obstacles remain, 
including the favourable treatment of debt under national tax regimes and the resistance of 
many entrepreneurs against dilution of their ownership rights
The growing significance of private equity transactions clearly raises questions of whether 
the EU regulatory agenda is still well aligned with market developments. Surprisingly, we 
found no evidence that the overall improvement in financing conditions in the euro area has 
been reflected in equity finance. Moreover, national policies have not really facilitated the 
engagement of equity investors. In most EU countries, broad indicators of corporate govern-
ance or investor protection do not show improvements. EU countries have fallen back in an 
international ranking.  
Lack of liquidity and expertise in national capital markets also explain the very limited 
cross-border integration of equity finance. Fund managers will always seek proximity to their 
investees and that is the essence of this investor class. But cross-border fundraising by private 
equity firms could be much greater. Facilitating the integration of equity investment should be 
a clear focus of the next phase of the EU capital markets union agenda. This will be a particu-
lar challenge as the UK, which is home to nearly half of the European private equity industry, 
is set to exit the single market and could develop a separate regulatory regime. 
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